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I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS PAPER proposes a fault diagnosis method based on a timed discrete-event approach using interval observers to solve the problem of fault detection and isolation (FDI) in the Barcelona sewer network. This network has a telemetry system used in real time for the control system. Sewer networks are complex large-scale systems that, in turn, require highly sophisticated supervisory control systems to ensure that high performance can be achieved and maintained under adverse conditions. Most cities around the world have sewage systems that combine sanitary and storm water flows within the same network. This is why these networks are known as combined sewage systems (CSSs). During rain storms, wastewater flows can easily overload these CSSs, thereby causing operators to dump the excess of water into the nearest receiver environment (rivers, streams, or sea). This discharge to the environment, known as combined sewage overflow (CSO), contains biological and chemical contaminants, creating a major environmental and public health hazard. Environmental protection agencies have started forcing municipalities to find solutions in order to avoid those CSO events. A possible solution to the CSO problem would be to enhance the existing sewer infrastructure by increasing the capacity of the wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) and by building new underground retention tanks. However, in order to take profit from these expensive infrastructures, it is also necessary to have a highly sophisticated realtime control (RTC) scheme that ensures that high performance can be achieved and maintained under adverse meteorological conditions [17] . In particular, the optimal real-time global control of a Barcelona sewer network aims to minimize flooding and combined sewer overflow to the environment and to maximize the WWTP utilization. However, the global optimal control of the sewer network is vulnerable to faults. Faults in sensors (rain gauges and limnimeters) and actuators (gates and pumps), particularly in heavy-rain scenarios, are usual. If these faults were not detected and isolated, the global optimal control would derive in anomalous performance of the network system, making it necessary to move the control to the local mode. 1 This will make very difficult the success of the global control system. One way of achieving fault tolerance is to employ an online FDI scheme, such that when a fault is detected and isolated, it will activate in response some accommodation action, which can be predetermined for each fault.
In general, when addressing the problem of FDI, two strategies can be found in the literature: hardware redundancy based on the use of redundant (extra) sensors and software (or analytical) redundancy based on the use of a mathematical model that combines measurements from other sensors or from the same sensor in past instants [23] . In critical systems (space aircraft, aeroplanes, etc.), hardware redundancy is preferred. However, for large-scale systems (such as the case of sewer networks), the use of hardware redundancy is very expensive and increases the number of maintenance and calibration operations. This is the reason why analytical redundancy has been recognized to be a good and cheaper alternative. This is the approach followed in this paper. In the literature, some related works on sensor fault diagnosis in sewer networks can be found that address the case of rain gauges [38] or the case of limnimeters [2] , [3] .
At the beginning of the research presented in this paper, the FDI problem in sewer network limnimeters was addressed using the standard well-established fault diagnosis methodologies coming from the FDI community [12] . However, several deficiencies were detected in either the fault detection or isolation stages when the standard FDI theory was applied to solve this problem. Mainly, the deficient performance was due to the poor (binary) interface between fault detection and fault isolation and the nonconsideration of the fault signal dynamics, as pointed out in [5] and [27] . This has motivated the development of the model-based fault diagnosis methodology presented in this paper based on the use of interval observers (in order to enhance robustness against modeling errors) in fault detection and on the use of a timed discrete-event isolation algorithm based on several fault signature matrices that considers additional information to the typical binary one. In particular, fault signature matrices containing information about residual fault sensitivity and residual time/order activation are used. Thereby, in the proposed approach, fault signals are represented as a temporal sequence of discrete events using a qualitative approach, while fault detection is based on an analytical model represented by an interval observer that takes account the parametric model uncertainty. This is why this approach can be considered as a BRIDGE approach [1] that tries to benefit from the best of the FDI and DX diagnosis communities.
The structure of this paper is given as follows. A description of the case study is given in Section II. Then, in Section III, the motivation and overview of the new fault diagnosis approach are introduced. The fault detection using interval observers is introduced in Section IV, focusing on the generation of fault signals and on their connection with the residual generator structure: the case study is used to exemplify the obtained results. Next, in Section V, the interface between fault detection and fault isolation is presented, showing how to obtain the theoretical fault signature matrices. In Section VI, the fault isolation algorithm based on a timed discrete-event system (TDES) is exposed. The interval-observer-based fault diagnosis algorithm will be applied to different fault scenarios of the case study to assess the validity of the derived results in Section VII. Section VIII closes this paper with the main conclusions.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDY

A. Barcelona Sewer Network Description
The city of Barcelona, with a population of 3 000 000 inhabitants in an area of 98 km 2 , has a combined sewer system (waste and rainwater go into the same sewers) of approximately 1500 km. Additionally, the yearly rainfall is not very high (600 mm/year), but it includes heavy storms typical of the Mediterranean climate that cause a lot of flooding problems and combined sewer overflows to the sea that cause pollution. Such a complex system is conducted through the control center in the Barcelona Sewer Company (CLABSA) using a remote control system (in operation since 1994) that includes sensors, regulators, remote stations and communications (Fig. 1) . Nowadays, for control purposes, the urban drainage system contains 21 pumping stations, 36 gates, 10 valves, and 10 detention tanks, which are regulated in order to prevent flooding and combined sewer overflow to the environment. The remote control system is equipped with 56 remote stations, including 22 rain gauges and 136 water-level sensors, which provide realtime information about rainfall and water levels into the sewer system. All this information is centralized at the CLABSA Control Center through a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. In local mode, all regulated elements (pumps, gates, and detention tanks) are locally controlled, i.e., they are handled from the remote control center according to the measurements of sensors connected only to the local station.
In global mode, the RTC of the sewer network is based on model-predictive control (MPC), which sets the references for local controllers located on different actuator (gates and pumps) elements of the sewer network using measurements taken from sensors distributed along the network and rain sensors. These references are computed in real time using an operational model to predict ahead of time the network dynamics, the current state of the system, which is provided by sensors, the current rain intensity measurements, and appropriate rainfall predictions [4] . The control objective is to minimize flooding and combined sewer overflow to the environment and to maximize the utilization of WWTPs. CORAL is the application software developed to implement in real time the optimal MPC global control of the Barcelona sewer network (Fig. 2) . This application has jointly been developed by the Advanced Control Systems (SAC) Research Group, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Terrassa, Spain and CLABSA. It is built in three main modules. The first is the model manager-the tool used to define a model and all its parameters. The second is the event simulator and reproducer-used to evaluate the system configuration and control strategies, to read a past rain from the CORAL database, and to display the consequent system behavior against rain scenarios. Finally, the third one is the online controller-used to read all sensor and actuator data from the SCADA system, link this data to the optimizer and launch it to calculate/compute the optimal control strategy, and finally send this strategy in the form of actuator set points to the SCADA system. More details can be found in [31] .
B. Case Study Description
The case study used to illustrate the fault diagnosis methodology proposed in this paper is based on a part of this network that covers a surface of 22.6 km 2 . It is constituted by 12 catchments (shaded areas in Fig. 3 ) of the 20 catchments of the city and contains three diversion gates, five overflows, and only one real detention tank, whose capacity is 35 000 m 3 . It includes the main sewer that carries water to the treatment plants and the four main seafront sea pollution points. Moreover, in this part of the network, there are five passive flow-diversion (overflow) devices, and the network is metered by means of four rain gauges and 14 limnimeters.
The water flow in sewers due to runoff is modeled as an open channel and can accurately be described using Saint-Venant equations 2 [17] , obtaining a complex nonline rainfall-runoff model that is being used for high-fidelity simulations. However, for online purposes, such as global optimal control and FDI, a simpler model must be used. The method used to derive a rainfall-runoff real-time model of a sewer network is through a simplified graph relating the main sewers and catchments as a set of virtual reservoirs [4] . A virtual reservoir is a conceptual model of a sewer network catchment that approximates the hydraulics of the retention of rain, runoff, and sewage water. The hydraulics of a virtual reservoir can be described by
where V is the water volume accumulated in the catchment, Q up and Q down are flows entering and exiting the catchment, P is the rain intensity falling in the catchment, and S is its surface (Fig. 4) . Input and output sewer levels are measured using limnimeters, and they can be associated with flows using a linearized Manning relation experimentally calibrated [10] as follows: 
where M is the Manning coefficient that relates the flow value in the sewer with the limnimeter measurement, and L up and L down are the measured levels. Moreover, assuming that the catchments behaves as linear virtual tanks,
where K v is defined as the conversion coefficient from volume to flow. Then, substituting these relations in (1) and considering the measurement sampling time (T s = 300 s in the Barcelona network), the following discrete-time model relating the limnimeter measurements of a given virtual reservoir can be derived:
where
Using this modeling methodology, the case of the study model is presented in Fig. 5 .
In this part of the network, there are 14 limnimeters (L 1 , . . . , L 14 ) and four rain gauges (P 1 , . . . , P 4 ). Rain gauges are spatially distributed in the Barcelona area, and each one affects more than one catchment (see Fig. 5 ). Applying (2) to each virtual reservoir considering the main paths, a set of nine discrete-time equations can be obtained and can be expressed as follows:
where, following model (2), a i,i is computed as a down ; a i,j is 0 if the tank j is not a preceding of tank i; otherwise, the value is computed as a up ; b i,q is 0 if tank j is not affected by P q ; otherwise, the value is computed as b. Then, (3) can also be written in discrete-time space state by defining the volumes of The model related to the case study has an additional equation corresponding to the real tank, relating the tank water level with the input and output flows, i.e.,
Moreover, two additional static mass balance equations can be written relating the flows measured by limnimeters L 11 and L 12 and by L 7 , L 13 , and L 14 , respectively.
As a result of applying the limnimeter model methodology described above, 12 analytical redundancy relations (ARRs) are obtained [37] . Table I presents the structural analysis of these relations. Each row is a redundant relation, denoted by r i , and each column is related to the variable measurements involved, either limnimeters or rain gauges. Thereby, a cross in a given cell indicates that the corresponding variable measurement is present in the related relation.
To exemplify the proposed FDI methodology, fault scenarios presented in this paper are focused on detecting and locating faults affecting the limnimeters that appear in the case study presented in Fig. 5 . Thus, the vector of faults f y to be detected is
It is assumed that just a single fault appears in a certain faulty scenario and that faults in limnimeters can additively be modeled as usually done in the case of sensors in the FDI approach [12] . Conversely, it can be noticed that Table I , which determines the limnimeter model structure, also includes rain gauges. However, in [26] , it is shown that faults in rain gauges can independently be handled from faults in limnimeters. 3 The complete FDI approach with faults in rain-gauges and actuators (valves and pumps) is presented in [30] . 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Evaluation of the Existing FDI Methods
Model-based FDI is based on a certain set of numerical fault indicators, known as residuals r(k), which are computed using the measured inputs u(k) and outputs y(k) of the monitored system, i.e.,
where Ψ is the residual generator function. This function allows computing the residual set at every time instant using the measurements of the system inputs and outputs. Ideally, according to [12] , residuals should be zero (or less than a threshold that takes into account noise and model uncertainty) when no fault is affecting the system. The fault detection task consists of deciding if there is a fault affecting the monitored system by checking each residual r i (k) of the residual set against a threshold that takes into account model uncertainty, noise, and the unknown disturbances. The result of this test applied to every residual r i (k) produces an observed fault signature
A basic way of obtaining these observed fault signals could be through a binary evaluation of every residual r i (k) against a threshold τ i [12] 
The observed fault signature is then supplied to the fault isolation module that will try to isolate the fault so that a fault diagnosis can be given. This module is able to produce such a fault diagnosis since it has the knowledge about the binary relation between the considered fault hypothesis set f (k) = {f (k) 1 , f 2 (k), . . . , f n f (k)} and the fault signal set φ(k). This relation is stored in the so-called theoretical binary fault signature matrix (F SM). Thereby, an element F SM ij of this matrix is equal to 1 if the fault hypothesis f j (k) is expected to affect the residual r i (k) such that the related fault signal φ i (k) is equal to 1 when this fault is affecting the monitored system. Otherwise, the element F SM ij is zero valued.
However, this basic FDI scheme, as already pointed out in the introduction, has the following drawbacks, among others (for more details, see [5] and [27] ):
1) The threshold τ i should be determined and adapted online according to the system inputs and outputs taking into account the model uncertainty.
2) The presence of the noise produces chattering if a binary evaluation of the residual is used.
according to the structure of the matrix F SM should be activated at the same time instant, and they should persistently be observed during the whole fault isolation process. Otherwise, a wrong fault diagnosis result could be given. Nonetheless, because fault signals have their own dynamics, they do not necessarily have to be activated at the same time nor be persistently observed. 4) Restricting the relation between faults and fault signals to a binary one causes loss of useful information that can add fault distinguishability and accurateness to the fault isolation algorithm, preventing possible wrong fault diagnosis results. The occurrence of a fault causes the apparition of a certain subset of fault signals such that each of them have characteristic dynamical properties for this fault that can improve the performance of the fault isolation algorithm if they are taken into account. Some of these problems should be considered by the fault detection module (for example, problems 1 and 2), while the others should be considered by the fault isolation module (for example, problems 3 and 4) or by the interface between both stages.
B. Proposed Approach
To address all these problems when using the standard FDI approach to limnimeter FDI, a new fault diagnosis approach is proposed. Fig. 6 presents an overview of the different modules and their role in such approach.
1) The fault detection module generates a fault signal measuring the system inputs and outputs, taking into account the model uncertainty. This is carried out using a fault detection interval observer, 4 which allows generating an adaptive threshold that evolves along time.
2) The fault detection/isolation interface module evaluates fault signals generated by the fault detection module in order to register their dynamical properties, which will allow the fault isolation module to isolate the fault among the considered fault hypotheses. These properties are summarized using several indicators, which take into account not only the activation value of the fault signal but also its fault sensitivity/sign and its activation time/order. This improved interface module tries to handle the problems associated with the fault signal persistence, the residual sensitivity to a fault, the fault signal occurrence order, and the fault signal occurrence time instant. As a result, the interface between fault detection and fault isolation modules is improved, enhancing the performance of the used fault diagnosis system. 3) The fault isolation model reasons with the information used to build all the indicators provided by the improved FDI interface using a discrete-event fault diagnosis model that can automatically be built taking into account the temporal aspects related to the fault signal sequence caused by the fault (fault signal occurrence order and time instant).
IV. FAULT DETECTION MODULE
A. Fault Detection Using Interval Observers
The main purpose of the fault detection module is the generation of fault signals so that the fault can be detected. The proposed fault detection algorithm is able to handle uncertainty, and consequently, it can be considered a robust approach. The robustness of a fault detection algorithm is given by the degree of sensitivity to faults compared with the degree of sensitivity to uncertainty. One of the most developed families of approaches to deal with model uncertainty, called active, is based on generating residuals, which are insensitive to uncertainty (modeling errors and disturbances), while at the same time sensitive to faults using some decoupling method [33] . On the other hand, there is a second family of approaches, called passive, which enhances the robustness of the fault detection system at the decision-making stage [29] using an adaptive threshold. This is the approach followed in this paper.
The FDI methodology proposed in this paper considers that the monitored system can analytically be described by a multiple-input-multiple-output linear uncertain dynamic model in discrete-time and state-space form, including faults, as follows:
where y(k) ∈ ny , u 0 (k) ∈ nu , 5 and x(k) ∈ nx are the system output, input, and the state-space vectors, respectively; A(θ) ∈ nx×nx , B(θ) ∈ nx×nu , and C(θ) ∈ ny×nx are the state, input, and output matrices, respectively;θ is the system parameter vector; f y (k) ∈ ny and f a (k) ∈ nu represent faults in the system output sensors and actuators, respectively, with F y (θ) ∈ ny×ny and F a (θ) ∈ nx×nu being their associated matrices.
The system (7) is monitored using a linear observer with a Luenberger structure based on an interval model. This type of model considers that model parameters θ are time invariant but bounded by an interval set Θ = {θ ∈ nθ |θ ≤ θ ≤ θ}. This set represents the uncertainty about the exact knowledge of real system parametersθ. The resulting interval observer can be written aŝ
where u is the measured system input vector,x(k) is the estimated system space-state vector, andŷ(k) is the estimated system output vector. Noticing that the relation between the measured system u and the real system input u 0 includes the effect of faults in the input sensors, the expression of u can be written as
where f u (k) ∈ nu is the input sensor fault, while F u (θ) ∈ nu×nu is its associated matrix. The observer gain matrix Λ 6 is designed to stabilize the matrix A o (θ) = A(θ) − ΛC(θ) and to guarantee the desired performance regarding fault detection for all θ ∈ Θ. The effect of the uncertain parameters θ on the observer temporal response allows the interval observer (8) to compute a system output interval estimationŷ(k) at every time instant instead of a single value. Thereby,ŷ(k) is bounded by the interval [ŷ(k),ŷ(k)], where for each output
Such interval can be computed using the algorithm based on numerical optimization presented in [26] . In case that there is no fault, each system output fulfills
Alternatively, the observer given by (8) can be expressed in input-output form using the q-transform and considering zero initial conditions as follows:
Model-based fault detection is based on generating a residual comparing the measurements of physical variables y(k) of the process with their estimationŷ(k) provided by the associated system model, i.e.,
where r(k) ∈ ny is the residual set. According to [12] , a generic form of a residual generator can be obtained using (12) and written as
This residual expression is known as its computational form. In addition, the residual (17) can also be expressed in terms of the effects caused by faults using its internal or unknown-inputeffect form [12] . This form, obtained by combining (16) , (12) , and (7), is expressed as
The term r θ (k) would be the expression of the residual if the system were unaffected by faults, being only caused by the parameter structured uncertainty.
Thereby, because of the consideration of model uncertainty located in the parameters as a fault detection passive robustness strategy, one way to compute the residual (18) might be using the nominal modelŷ o (k, θ o ) given by the interval observer (8)
Then, in a nonfaulty scenario, r o (k) should be zero valued at every time instant k considering an ideal situation. Nevertheless, it will never be satisfied since the system can be affected by unknown inputs (i.e., noise, nuisance disturbances, etc.) and the model might be affected by some error assumptions (model errors) apart from its considered parameter uncertainty. Thus, the residual generated (22) cannot be expected to be zero valued in a nonfaulty scenario. However, propagating the interval observer parameter uncertainty to the residual, the values of the nominal residual (22) will be bounded by the interval [29] [r
withŷ i (k) andŷ i (k) being the bounds of the ith-system output estimation computed using the interval observer (8) and obtained according to (10) . As a result, while the nominal residual r o i (k) satisfies the following relation, a fault cannot be indicated since the system outputs satisfy the relation (11):
where the interval (23) can be seen as an adaptive threshold [29] . Then, the main goal of the fault detection module consists of checking for every residual r o i (k) if the relation (25) holds or not. According to [7] , this fault detection strategy achieves robustness against model uncertainty by generating an adaptive threshold through propagating (instead of decoupling) parameter uncertainty to the residual.
B. Fault Signal Generation
The fault detection test (25) relies on the comparison of the numerical value of the nominal residual r o i (k), which may be affected by noise, with its associated adaptive threshold. This binary procedure may lead to undesirable decision instability (chattering) because of the effect of noise on the sensor measurements, and consequently, a persistency criterion should be introduced [36] . Such as indicated by the diagnostic model processor approach [24] , a gradual reasoning involved by the use of fuzzy logic is an appealing alternative to bypass this chattering phenomenon. Then, as it was proposed in [26] , the fault diagnostic signal (or fault signal) for each residual is calculated in the approach presented in this paper using the Kramer function [24] , i.e.,
The appealing performance of this function is due to its introduced grading when evaluating the residual in order to conclude the existence or not of a fault. When using the Kramer function (26) , the residuals are normalized to a metric between −1 and 1, i.e., φ i (k) ∈ [−1, 1], which indicates the degree of satisfaction of (25) for every nominal residual r o i (k): 0 for perfectly satisfied, 1 for severely violated high, and −1 for severely violated low. In this paper, a fault signal will be notated as φ i (k), and as in [14] , it is considered that it is activated by the fault presence if |φ i (k)| ≥ 0.5. Otherwise, the fault signal is considered nonactivated. Conversely, the set of all fault signals will be notated as φ = {φ i : i = 1, 2, . . . , n y }.
C. Fault Signal Dynamics
According to [12] , the theoretical dynamic properties of a fault signal φ i (k) caused by a given fault f j are set by what is known as the sensitivity of the associated residual r i (k) to this fault f j . The concept of the residual sensitivity to a fault set according to [12] can analytically be expressed as
Thus, the residual sensitivity to a fault is a transfer function that describes how a fault is affecting the residual, and consequently, the dynamic properties of the fault signals caused by this fault.
Concerning the fault detection stage whose main task is the generation of fault signals, [21] shows the importance of this concept in both the residual time evolution and the quality of the fault detection.
Analyzing the residual internal form (18) and considering the fault residual sensitivity definition (27) , the residual sensitivity functions to the faults f y , f u , and f a are given by
where S fy ∈ ny × ny is associated with f y , S fu ∈ ny × nu is associated with f u , and S fa ∈ ny × nu is associated with f a .
Then, taking into account (28)- (30) in (18), it can be seen that this residual form can be rewritten in terms of residual sensitivity functions, i.e.,
Thereby, as the fault signals φ i (k) are generated, evaluating residual (31) such as indicated by (22) and (23) and applying (26) , the following conclusions can be obtained.
1) The fault residual sensitivity functions establish which
2) The fault residual sensitivity functions establish the dynamic of a given fault signal regarding a given fault.
3) The knowledge of the dynamic properties of the fault residual sensitivity functions allow inferring the theoretical dynamic properties of the fault signal sequence generated by the occurrence of a given fault.
D. Application to the Case Study
The interval observer equation (12) has been applied to the network prototype presented in Section II. Notice that (3) could easily be written as an observer model (8) , where the system output, input, and state-space vectors are the measured sewer level given by the limnimeters, the rain intensity measured using rain gauges, and the predicted sewer level determined by the limnimeter model, respectively. The element of matrix A placed at the ith file and jth column is determined by the value a i,j of (8), while the element of matrix B placed at the ith file and qth column is given by b i,q of (8) . These values are not null when there is a cross in the corresponding positions in Table I . Concerning matrix C, it is assumed to be the identity matrix. Thereby, the related limnimeters have been modeled using interval-reduced observers in order to estimate their output value.
As an example, in this section, the models related to limnimeters L 4 and L 6 are given bŷ where λ i,j is the element of the observer gain matrix Λ placed at the ith file and jth column and that is parameterized as follows:
In the case study presented in Section II, the value of the parameters and their associated uncertainty bounded using intervals are estimated using real data from the sensors installed in the network. This process guarantees that the observerestimated interval output includes all the limnimeter nonmodeled effects, which is what is achieved using an algorithm inspired by the one proposed in [25] . This methodology uses the classical identification approaches such as the least-squares method in order to provide the nominal values of the model parameters. Then, using optimization tools, the uncertainty parameter intervals of the considered reduced observer are adjusted using a worst-case approach [26] until all the measured data are covered by the model-estimated output interval for the considered observer gain. Thereby, using this methodology, the parameter values of the interval-reduced observers (32) and (33) In Fig. 7 , the time evolution of the measurements related to the limnimeters L 4 and L 6 and their interval estimations given by the associated interval-reduced observers (32) and (33) are plotted assuming a nonfaulty scenario and using the observer gains corresponding to w 44 = w 66 = 0.01.
According to (16) , the estimations given by the intervalreduced observers related to the modeled limnimeter set (Table I ) allow obtaining a set of 12 residuals. As an example, the computational form of the nominal residuals associated with the limnimeters L 4 and L 6 are given by , respectively, which are computed using (24) . Thereby, for the case of residual r 4 (k)
Concerning to the residual sensitivity to a fault whose general expression is given by (27) , the sensitivity of the residual r
Regarding the residual r o 6 (k) in (35) , its sensitivity to an additive fault in L 6 (f L6 ) and in L 4 (f L4 ) are, respectively
V. FDI INTERFACE
A. Background
Regarding the connection between fault detection and fault isolation modules, these stages are generally considered separately in model-based fault diagnosis (either using FDI or DX methods). The typical interface between these two modules is through a binary codification of the evaluation of every residual or every ARR that generates a fault signature. These last years, the integration between fault detection and fault isolation tasks in FDI model-based fault diagnosis has been a very active research area (see, among others, [15] , [22] , [32] , [35] , [39] , and [40] ). In this line, the dynamic properties of the fault signals caused by a certain fault mainly depends on the dynamic properties of the residual generator used in fault detection since the evaluation of this element at every time instant allows the generation of the fault signals [20] . Thus, it can be said that the fault isolation result is closely affected by the fault detection stage since the residual generator structure (used by the fault isolation module to locate the fault) determines the relationship between faults and the dynamical properties of fault signals [18] . Thus, in order to accurately diagnose, fault detection and fault isolation cannot independently be considered. In addition, when observers are used as a fault detection mechanism, the result of the fault detection stage is influenced by the observer gain matrix because it deeply affects the dynamic properties of the residual generator [19] . Therefore, the theoretical dynamic properties of the fault signal sequence generated by a certain fault will be also influenced by the observer gain. This way, it will be shown that all available and useful information of the FDI tasks is considered. The interface between fault detection and fault isolation considers the degree of fault signal activation and the occurrence time of the diagnostic signals using a combination of several theoretical fault signature matrices that store knowledge of the relationship between diagnostic signals and faults. Thus, the diagnosis result will be enhanced since the occurrence of a fault generates a unique sequence of observable events (fault signals) that will be recognized by the isolation module implemented as a TDES, as discussed in Section VI.
B. Proposed Interface
The used interface in this paper is based on a generalization of the theoretical fault signature matrix (F SM) [12] concept where the binary interface is extended, taking into account more fault signal properties [28] . In this approach, there are as many F SM matrices as different properties taken into account: the Boolean property (F SM01), the fault residual sensitivity property (F SM sensit), the occurrence order property (F SMorder), and the occurrence time instant (F SMtime). Those matrices store the influence of the considered faults on the residual set: the element F SM ij of a matrix contains the expected influence of fault f j on r o i . The following sections illustrate how to obtain matrices F SM sensit and F SMtime using the interval observer model of the monitored system, while the other two matrices can clearly be derived from them.
C. F SM sensit: Evaluation of Fault Signal Sensitivities
The value of an element of the table F SM sensit, i.e., F SM sensit ij , describes how easily a fault f j (f yj , f uj , f aj ) will cause the ith residual r o i (k) to violate its associated adaptive threshold given by the interval (23) originating from the occurrence of the fault signal φ i (k) (26) . Thereby, according to the residual internal form (31) and the main results of Section IV-C, every element F SM sensit ij must directly be proportional to the fault residual sensitivity function S f (q 
where η(k) is a unitary abrupt step input, S r i ,f j (q −1 ) is the sensitivity associated to the nominal residual r o i (k) regarding the fault hypothesis f j (f yj , f uj , f aj ), and t 0 is the fault occurrence time instant. When t 0 is unknown, it must be estimated using the occurrence time instant k φi of the first observed fault signal φ i (k). As a consequence of the fault residual sensitivity time dependence, F SM sensit ij dynamically evolves since the fault occurrence time instant t 0 .
The consistency between the observed sequence of fault signals φ i (k) and the theoretical information stored in F SM sensit for the jth-fault hypothesis can be evaluated computing f actorsensit j as follows:
and |φ i (k)| ≥ 0.5 1, otherwise. (42) Thus, this factor uses the values φ i (k) of every fault signal weighted by the corresponding elements F SM sensit ij related to the fault hypothesis f j in order to set the occurrence probability of this fault hypothesis. Thus, when computing f actorsensit j such as it is indicated by (41), the following behavior is obtained: those expected and observed fault signals support the fault hypothesis f j , while the observation of an unexpected fault signal lets rejecting that fault hypothesis of the final diagnosis result. Moreover, those missing fault signals also indirectly affect the supportability of the fault hypothesis via the denominator of (41).
Concerning matrix F SM01, known as the binary theoretical fault signature matrix [12] , it must be noticed that this matrix can easily be derived from F SM sensit (40) by applying the following conversion:
In this case, the consistency between the observed sequence of fault signals φ i (k) and the theoretical information stored in F SM01 for the jth-fault hypothesis can be evaluated by computing factor01 j as follows:
D. F SMtime: Evaluation of the Fault Signal Occurrence Time Instant
When a fault f j occurs, the affected residuals need different times to start, indicating the fault, or equivalently, the fault signals require different times to appear. Each element of the jth column of the matrix F SMtime contains the time interval [ϕ ij , ϕ ij ] in which the fault signal φ i (k) is expected to appear.
The value ϕ ij is associated with the minimum f j -type fault, which is considered to be isolated, while ϕ ij is associated with the maximum f j -type fault the monitored system might suffer. Thus, the values ϕ ij for a given fault f j could be estimated by carrying out a test for every residual. This tests is based on comparing the residual disturbance caused by a fault in the nominal residual r o i (k) with the adaptive threshold given by (23) related to the observer when the system is unaffected by a fault [21] . Deriving from fault detection test (25) and from the residual internal form (31) , this test can be written as
where f * j (k) is the worst case of an f j -type fault the monitored system might suffer, and S r i ,f j is the sensitivity of the residual r i (k) regarding a fault f j (k). Then, the time the residual requires to start indicating the fault (δ ij ) is obtained using the minimum time instant k min that satisfies (46), i.e.,
When monitoring a system, the fault occurrence time instant t 0 is unknown in general. Hence, the values δ ij associated to the fault hypothesis f j must be referred to the first observed fault signal. Then
The value ϕ ij might also be calculated using test (46) but in this case, f * j (k) is the minimum f j -type fault, which is considered to be isolated. Thus, the values δ ij are obtained, and then
Regarding the elements of matrix F SMtime
the influence of the observer gain on the interval [ϕ ij , ϕ ij ] is remarkable. Consequently, a proper design might help so that all the fault signals were observed at the same time instant. Deriving from F SMtime, one of the most important parameters of the fault isolation algorithm can be obtained. This is the time window T w that determines the maximum period of time required once the first fault signal is observed so that all fault signals can appear. In other words, T w is the period of time needed, once the first fault signal is detected, to give an accurate fault diagnosis result, unless there was only one fault hypothesis left supporting the observed fault signal temporal sequence before T w would have ended. Thereby, T w can be obtained as follows:
On the other hand, in order to compare the occurrence time instant of the observed fault signal sequence with the stored one 
where k φi is the occurrence time instant of the fault signal φ i (k), k ref is the occurrence time instant of the first observed fault signal, and
Concerning the occurrence order property of the fault signals affected by the fault hypothesis f j , the jth column of the table F SMorder contains their theoretical occurrence order, which is codified using ordinal numbers, starting with "1." Regarding those fault signals that are theoretically not affected by that fault hypothesis, they are coded with "0" in the corresponding cells of the matrix F SMorder. Thus, the elements of this matrix for an f j -type fault can be derived from F SMtime by applying the following rule:
where δ j is a vector that contains the nonrepeated elements ϕ ij of the jth column of F SMtime in ascending order and whose values are not equal to −1. According to the residual internal form (31), it can be seen that the fault signal occurrence order for a given fault hypothesis is basically determined by the fault residual sensitivity function and by the adaptive threshold.
Then, comparing the fault signal observed information with the theoretical one stored in the matrix F SMorder, the occurrence probability of every fault hypothesis can be calculated by computing f actororder j , i.e.,
and
and order(φ i (k)) is the observed occurrence order of the fault signal φ i (k).
E. Application to the Case Study
Considering the set of interval-reduced observers (Section IV-D) used to monitor the limnimeter outputs of the Barcelona sewer network presented in Fig. 5 , the value of the matrices F SM sensit and F SMtime are given in this section. These matrices are computed taking into account that the observer gains w i,j (λ i,j = w i,j a i,j ) of all interval observers are equal to 0.01 (Section IV-D) and the occurrence of the first fault signal is detected at time instant t 0 = 4000 s.
Regarding to F SM sensit (see Section V-C), it must be taken into account that each element of this matrix is a time function mainly based on the sensitivity of the residual related to a certain fault signal to a given fault hypothesis (40) . Thus, in the following, the elements of the F SM sensit matrix illustrated in Table II are just the fault residual sensitivity steadystate values instead of the ones derived from (40) . However, the presented fault isolation algorithm does use this equation to obtain the elements of F SM sensit. In this table, f Lj is a fault affecting the limnimeter L j , while φ Li is the fault signal associated with the residual r Li obtained using the interval observer model of L i . For instance, considering the column of F SM sensit associated with the fault hypothesis f L4 , the value of the cell related to the fault signal φ L4 is given by the steadystate value of the sensitivity function S r 4 ,f L4 (q −1 ) (37) when applied a unitary abrupt step input η(k) at t 0 = 4000 s. Table III presents the F SMtime matrix (see Section V-D), where the fault occurrence time intervals are expressed in seconds. According to the value of the presented F SMtime and (51), the value of the diagnosis time window for this scenario is T w = 30 600 s, taking into account that T s = 300 s is the sample time period.
VI. FAULT ISOLATION MODULE
A. Background
The basic idea of a fault isolation module is that the occurrence of a fault will generate a unique sequence of observable fault signals (events) that will establish the presence of a given fault. In general, the model type (qualitative or quantitative) used in fault isolation depends on the type of the used fault detection model. However, since a fault signal can be seen as a discrete-time event with a given occurrence time instant, dynamics, and duration, the use of those qualitative models known as timed discrete-events models naturally follows [13] , [15] . In this sense, [9] uses a labeled transition system (LTS), considering the fault signal occurrence order. This LTS is built on the grounds of a causal graph that models the behavior of the monitored system. Conversely, the temporal dynamic table of states method [14] models the relationship between fault signals and faults using the so-called fault information system (FIS) . The fault isolation algorithm used by this method is based on series inference where the occurrence of a new fault signal narrows the possible fault hypotheses, checking its observed properties and the information stored in the FIS. However, this kind of models is not very common when the fault detection stage is modeled using an analytical model (at least in the FDI community). In this paper, the proposed fault diagnosis approach will combine a fault isolation qualitative timed discrete-event model with an analytical model used in fault detection.
B. Fault Isolation Algorithm as a DES
As mentioned before, the fault isolation module can be formalized as a discrete-event system (DES) 7 since a fault signal can be seen as a discrete-time event. Thereby, the occurrence of a fault will cause a sequence of fault signals whose dynamical properties should allow obtaining a fault diagnosis result. Taking into account the temporal aspects in the sequence of fault signals (order and time instant of occurrence), a TDES 7 Fault isolation methods built using a DES consist of a set of states connected by transitions [34] . The transitions are related to events generated by the fault effect on the monitored system, while the states indicate a certain situation of the whole fault isolation process. Moreover, when these transitions are built taking into account some temporal aspects, the DES is known as a TDES [6] . will allow more accurately modeling the fault isolation process from the occurrence of the first fault signal of the temporal sequence until a fault isolation result is given. A TDES of this type is known as a timed LTS (TLTS). A TLTS can be seen as an evolution of the LTS family [9] since an LTS does not consider the occurrence time instant of the fault signals in order to determine the fault isolation result. Using this modeling approach, the fault signals would be the events, the states would be given by all the fault hypotheses supporting the observed fault signal sequence, and the transitions would be set by the comparison between the theoretical and the observed dynamical properties of the fault signals. Fig. 8 presents the components of the fault isolation and interface modules, which derive from an evolution of the architecture proposed in [28] . As mentioned above, the main idea of this fault isolation process is that a given fault affecting the monitored system will cause a unique temporal sequence of fault signals that will allow obtaining a diagnosis result by comparing their observed dynamical properties with the ones stored for each fault hypothesis in the fault isolation matrices.
C. Fault Isolation and Interface Module Components 1) Description:
The fault isolation algorithm starts with the occurrence of the first fault signal and ends when there is only one fault hypothesis supporting the observed temporal sequence of fault signals or when the diagnosis time window T w (51) has ended. Thereby, the first element of this algorithm is a memory component that registers some information of the observed fault signals. The second element is a timed series inference component that compares the stored information of a new observed fault signal with the information stored in matrices F SM01, F SMtime, and F SMorder for those nonrejected fault hypotheses. The result of this series inference component is the rejection of those fault hypotheses that do not support the observations. When there is only one fault hypothesis left, the algorithm ends giving that hypothesis as the fault diagnostic result. Otherwise, when the time window T w has ended, the third element, which is the pattern comparison component, computes f actorsensit j for those nonrejected fault hypotheses. Then, the last element, which is the logic decision component, gives as a diagnostic result the fault hypothesis with the biggest absolute value of the factor f actorsensit j .
In the following, a more detailed explanation of the performance of the memory component and the timed series inference component will be given.
2) Memory Component: The memory component consists of a table that stores some information related to the time evolution of each fault signal. Thereby, once the first fault signal is observed the memory component stores the occurrence time instant (k φi ), defined as the first time instant where φ i (k φi ) is activated, and the fault signal value (φ i max ) 8 whose absolute value is maximum. Every time the fault detection module detects a new fault signal φ i (k) or an observed fault signal reaches a new value φ i max , this memory is updated with the new information situation. Then, after a fault diagnosis result is given by the fault isolation module, the memory component is reset, being ready to start the diagnosis of a new fault. This reset consists of deleting the information related to all vanished fault signals and the value φ i max of those fault signals that can still be observed at this time instant.
3) Timed Series Inference Component: This component is based on the fact that each new fault signal allows rejecting those hypotheses that do not support the observations. In consequence, a diagnosis result can be given before the time window T w ends. Thereby, the rejection of a certain fault hypothesis when a new fault signal is observed is based
on the comparison of its information stored in the memory component with its theoretical one for this fault hypothesis stored in matrices F SM01, F SMtime, and F SMorder. This leads to the following performance: the observation of a new fault signal will allow narrowing the subset of fault hypotheses that are still supporting the observations and, consequently, the ones that are still candidates to set the diagnosis result. When there is just one fault hypothesis left, the reasoning process ends giving it as the diagnosis result. Otherwise, the process ends once the period of time T w has ended since the observation of the first fault signal.
This component can be built using a TLTS where the initial state is the nonfaulty state; then, each fault hypothesis (set f ) has a TLTS representation that is connected to this initial state. The TLTS representation associated with a given fault hypothesis shows the fault signal temporal sequence caused by this fault. In each state transition, the properties of the new observed fault signal are compared with those stored in F SM01, F SMorder, and/or F SMtime for this fault hypothesis. The present state of a fault hypothesis TLTS representation just indicates that this fault hypothesis is still supporting the observed fault signal temporal sequence. When a new fault signal occurs, for each nonrejected fault hypothesis, the state transition starting at the present state is evaluated. If this evaluation fails, the fault hypothesis is rejected. At the end of the diagnosis time window T w , those nonrejected fault hypotheses will establish the final fault diagnosis result.
According to the definition given by [9] for an LTS, a TLTS can be seen as the following tuple:
where Q j is the set of states, q 0 is the initial state, Σ j is the set of labels, and δ j is the set of transitions. Thus, when applying this TLTS definition to model the presented timed series inference component, there will be a tuple T j related to every fault hypothesis f j that belongs to the set f of all the considered fault hypotheses. All this set of elements T j will just have one component in common: the state q 0 related to the nonfaulty state. Regarding the states Q pj ∈ Q j , its number n Qj is set by the number of fault signals φ i (k) affected by the fault hypothesis f j . This is
The present state Q pj of T j just has the meaning that the fault hypothesis f j is still supporting the observations.
Regarding the transitions δ pj of the set δ j , they connect Q (p−1)j with Q pj , with q 0 being the first state. Thus, there will be, for a certain T j , a transition for every fault signal related to the fault hypothesis f j : this is n Qj . This way, the transition δ pj will be related to the fault signal φ i (k) whose theoretical occurrence order for this fault hypothesis is given by "p" (F SMorder ij = p). Thereby, concerning the sequence of transitions and states in T j , they have an ascending order set by p = 1, . . . , n Qj .
About the labels Σ pj of the set Σ j , there is one for each transition δ pj and, consequently, for each fault signal φ i (k) related to the fault hypothesis f j . Thereby, the evaluation of all the labels Σ pj is carried out when the pth-fault signal φ i (k) is observed. If the evaluation of Σ pj fails, the fault hypothesis f j is rejected. Otherwise, the state Q pj becomes the present state of T j . Thereby, Σ pj is carried out by evaluating the relation
where the functions checkorder and checktime are given by (57) and (53), respectively. According to what was previously mentioned, a diagram of the set of elements T j that models the performance of this timed series inference component is presented in Fig. 9 .
D. Application to the Case Study
In this section and for the considered case study (see Fig. 5 ), a fault isolation process will be designed following the architecture presented in Section VI-C. The main focus will be on the TLTS used to model the timed series inference component (see Fig. 9 ). In this case, this fault isolation model will be built just considering a subset of seven fault hypotheses affecting 13 , and L 14 of the fault set f y (4). In Fig. 10 , the label of the transition related to the fault signal φ Li for the fault hypothesis f Lj (fault affecting limnimeter L j ) will be noted as Σ Li−Lj (60), while all the states related to a certain fault hypothesis will be notated as f Lj .
The associated representation of this TLTS can be seen as the integration of all the information stored in F SM01, F SMorder, and F SMtime in the same structure.
Focusing on a fault scenario 9 where a fault affecting limnimeter L 4 occurs at t 0 = 4000 s, the time evolution of the affected residuals r (Fig. 11) .
Analyzing the time evolution of those residuals and according to (25) and (26) , the first observed fault signal will be φ L4 (the fault signal related to limnimeter L 4 observer model) since time instant t = t 0 . The time evolution of f actorsensit j (41) and factortime j (52) related to all fault hypotheses of the set f y (4) is plotted at every time instant in Fig. 12 .
It can be seen that only those factors related to the fault hypothesis f L4 are activated from the fault occurrence time instant. Then, according to the fault isolation discrete-event model presented in Fig. 10 and the information stored in F SM01, F SMorder, and F SMtime, all fault hypotheses, except f L4 (the fault affecting L 4 ), will be rejected. Afterward, the fault signal φ L6 is observed to be supporting the LTS representation associated with f L4 (see Fig. 13 ).
VII. COMPARISON WITH THE STANDARD FDI APPROACH
In this section, the proposed timed discrete-event FDI approach is compared with the standard FDI approach based on the binary diagnostic matrix (F SM01) [12] using a parallel diagnostic inference [12] . Thereby, this method tries to give a diagnosis result at every time instant, checking the binary property of the observed fault signals with the theoretical information stored in matrix F SM01. Those fault hypotheses whose theoretical fault signature fully matches with the observed fault signals are given as a fault diagnosis result.
In the considered fault scenario, a fault affecting limnimeter L 7 occurs at t 0 = 4000 s. In this case, all the interval observers used to monitor the limnimeters were tuned using the observer gains (λ i,j = w i,j a i,j ) corresponding to w i,j = 0.01, except the one used to monitor L 7 , whose observer gain was determined by w 7,7 = 0.5. In Fig. 14 figure, for every residual, a fault detection indicator is plotted to signal out when the associated fault signal is observed or not (25) .
According to matrices F SM sensit (Table II) and F SMtime (Table III) , a fault affecting L 7 will cause the observation of three fault signals: φ L7 and φ L14 when the fault occurs and φ L5 once some time has elapsed. Thus, in this scenario, φ L7 was the first observed fault signal. Moreover, due to the configuration of the observer that monitors L 7 , φ L7 is not persistently observed and vanishes before φ L5 appears. In this situation, once φ L7 has vanished, the binary fault signature associated with f L14 matches the binary property of the observed fault signals. In this case, the binary fault isolation approach will give f L14 as a fault diagnosis result instead of f L7 , which is the right result.
In the following, the time evolution of the binary approach fault diagnosis result is given considering a set of possible results determined by f L3 , f L5 , f L7 , f L13 , and f L14 . Fig. 15 shows how the binary approach gives a wrong fault diagnosis result as a consequence of the lack of persistence of φ L7 . In Figs. 16 and 17 , the time evolution of f actorsensit j (41) and factortime j (52) related to the fault hypotheses f L3 , f L5 , f L7 , f L13 , and f L14 is plotted at every time instant. It can be seen that, in spite of the lack of persistence of φ L7 , the proposed fault diagnosis method is not confused due to the used timed discrete-event approach that takes into account the dynamical properties of the fault signals.
Then, according to the fault isolation discrete-event model presented in Fig. 10 and the information stored in F SM01, F SMorder, and F SMtime, all fault hypotheses, except f L7 (the fault affecting L 7 ), will be rejected (see Fig. 18 ).
VIII. CONCLUSION
Taking into account the importance of fault detection and fault isolation on the optimal control of the Barcelona sewer network, this paper has proposed a model-based fault diagnosis method using a timed discrete-event approach based on interval observers that improves the integration of FDI tasks. This proposed approach tackles the drawbacks of the classical FDI fault diagnosis methods based on a binary interface between fault detection and fault isolation without considering the fault signal dynamics. As a consequence, when applying these classical methodologies to diagnose faults affecting the limnimeters of the Barcelona sewer network, a poor performance of the control system has been obtained. Concerning the proposed discreteevent fault diagnosis approach, the interface between fault detection and fault isolation module considers the degree of fault signal activation and the occurrence time instant of the fault signals using a combination of several fault signature matrices that store knowledge of the relationship between diagnostic signals and faults. Such fault signature matrices can be derived from the system model using the fault sensitivity analysis. Moreover, exploiting the discrete-time event nature of the fault signals generated by the fault detection module, a fault diagnoser based on a timed discrete-event model can automatically be implemented. Using such an approach, faults can be diagnosed since their occurrence generates a unique sequence of observable events (fault signals) that can be recognized by the isolation module. The states and transitions that characterize such a model can directly be inferred from the relationship between fault signals and faults. As further research, the method would be extended to handle multiplicative and multiple faults. Furthermore, the extension to nonlinear systems would be considered.
